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As Sandmo (in this volume) shows, under some circumstances efficiency and
equity concerns must go hand in hand to avoid further inequity. The challenge is
to strike the appropriate balance between efficiency and equity—with equity
largely determined by society’s notions of justice and fairness.
At the same time, Albin (in this volume) points out the wide range of often
conflicting views that people and scholars hold when it comes to justice and fair-
ness. Views on justice and fairness for environmental issues—the focus of this
chapter—are no exception. The international community has acknowledged that
industrial and developing countries have “common but differentiated responsi-
bilities” and different capabilities for contributing to the provision of climate sta-
bility, a global public good (UNFCCC 1992, art. 3). A first step toward applying
this principle was the decision to define binding commitments for industrial
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2008–12.
But greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries are expected to grow
rapidly over the coming decades. Thus future international negotiations on cli-
mate stability—and the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions needed to achieve
it—will have to address developing country contributions to this global public
good. What notions of justice and fairness should guide policy proposals and tar-
gets for emission limits in developing countries? This question has no easy answer,
and negotiations on these issues face several challenges.
The basic principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and differ-
ent capabilities has been translated into a series of specific differentiation rules.
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But analysis of these rules leads to a conclusion similar to that of Albin (in this
volume)—that no single rule is likely to achieve broad political acceptance in the
foreseeable future. This is the first challenge facing negotiators.
A second challenge is that the goal is not to achieve merely equity but also effi-
ciency. The current international regime for stabilizing the climate, the Kyoto
Protocol (UNFCCC 1997), proposes “flexibility mechanisms” so that countries
can achieve emission targets in efficient, affordable ways. These mechanisms—
international emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism—involve interntional trading of permits to emit greenhouse
gases (for more details, see Castro and Cordero in this volume). So, even if nego-
tiators succeeded in agreeing on a principle of equity, what would happen to dis-
tributive justice once trading occurs? In other words, how fair will the ultimate
policy outcome be?
These challenges cannot be resolved without scenario building and modeling
efforts. In the past, negotiators often had to make decisions despite uncertainties
about the realities of climate change. Today, however, extensive data are available
to generate well-informed analyses.
Indeed, this chapter’s purpose is to demonstrate the possibilities for better,
more informed decisionmaking. Such decisionmaking opens new avenues for
political pragmatism, making it possible to explore the effects of incremental pol-
icy changes resulting from possible decisions—concessions—made by one nego-
tiating party or another. Most important, this chapter shows that it is possible to
do what many have considered difficult: to combine efficiency and equity con-
siderations and even to satisfy various rules on differentiation and various notions
of justice.
The approach proposed here is pragmatic and politically feasible because it
does not require agreement on specific criteria at the outset. The model can be
based on different assumptions, and the assumptions can be changed through an
iterative process until the negotiating parties are satisfied with the projected out-
come. Moreover, there is a greater likelihood that the parties will agree on the pro-
jected outcome because it will likely satisfy several of the expectations that they
bring to the bargaining table. With current analytical tools, there is no longer a
need to wait three or four decades to see the consequences of today’s policy
choices. It is now possible to determine likely outcomes before embarking on cer-
tain policy paths.
COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILIT Y:
AN ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE LEADING TO CONTESTED RULES
This section first examines the differentiation of countries’ commitment to con-
tribute to global climate stability as indicated by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol. The section
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then reviews various proposals on how this principle could be translated into rules
to guide policymaking. Finally, it discusses the dilemma that this multiplicity of
rules creates for policymakers—and why this dilemma is less of a problem than
it would appear at first sight.
Differentiation: a key component of the climate change regime
The UNFCCC uses the term differentiation in the broad sense of taking into
account national characteristics in order to achieve the convention’s ultimate goal.
Here, however, the term is used in the more restrictive sense of differentiating
countries’ quantified objectives for limiting and reducing emissions, because the
analysis focuses on how these objectives can be shared among the parties to the
convention.
As noted, climate stability is the global public good in question, and its prop-
erties are nonrival and nonexcludable. But climate stability is based on another,
impure global public good (a “common pool”resource): an atmosphere protected
against excessive emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide
emissions are a major component of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. So, one of
the tasks facing the international community in achieving climate stability is
reducing these emissions.
Accordingly, countries have an incentive to maximize the emissions
allowance granted to them and to minimize the costs of achieving required emis-
sion reductions. Thus while the final good of climate stability is public and avail-
able for all to enjoy, the effort of producing it needs to be apportioned. The
production effort involves two tasks: quantifying emission allowances (that is, cre-
ating rules for sharing the scarce good—the “entitlement” to emit greenhouse
gases) and sharing the costs of achieving emissions reduction targets. These tasks
are closely intertwined, because the costs of a country’s efforts depend, among
other things, on its emissions allowance.
The UNFCCC differentiates emissions reduction targets by country groups.
Annex 1 countries—industrial countries and transition economies—have agreed
to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions by 2000 at 1990 levels. Non–Annex 1 coun-
tries—developing countries—have no such obligation. This setup reflects the par-
ties’ differing historical responsibilities for creating the greenhouse effect. The
distinction between Annex 1 and non–Annex 1 countries can be called the pri-
mary differentiation.
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, introduces a secondary differentiation.
The protocol stipulates that between 2008 and 2012, Annex 1 countries must, as
a group, cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels.
Emissions reduction requirements are similar for the European Union (–8 per-
cent), the United States (–7 percent), and Japan (–6 percent). Elsewhere, however,
reduction rates are more differentiated, and some are actually growth rates.
Examples include Iceland (+10 percent), Australia (+8 percent), Norway (+1 per-
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cent), and New Zealand, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (no change). No
clear rule led to this differentiation; it was more the result of political haggling
(Babiker and Eckaus 2000; Viguier 1999). Still, the differentiation roughly reflects
the parties’ different economic, technological, and energy situations.
Proposed differentiation rules for achieving climate stability
Thus recent negotiations and existing agreements provide limited guidance on
exactly how to implement the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and different capabilities for contributing to climate stability. Little con-
crete policy advice is available on options for the possible inclusion of developing
countries in future agreements on emission targets. So, in assessing options, one
should start by examining various proposals put forward by policymakers and
scientists since the late 1980s, in preparation for and in response to the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth
Summit).
These proposals address the two main tasks, identified above, in the produc-
tion effort for climate stability—quantifying emission allowances and sharing the
costs of achieving emissions reduction targets. Most of the differentiation rules
proposed by country representatives in negotiations refer to emission allowances,
because emission levels are easier to monitor than mitigation costs. Some of the
most frequently proposed rules include (see also table 1):
• Equalizing per capita emission limits. This rule would inevitably lead to
lower emission allowances for industrial countries and higher emission
allowances for developing countries, compared with current levels.1 Thus
developing countries would be allowed to increase per capita emissions for
a certain period.2
• Allocating emission allowances based on current or cumulative emissions. This
rule is also known as that of “inherited quotas” or “grandfathering.” It
would undoubtedly benefit industrial countries because current emissions
would be considered an “acquired right” (Godard 1997). Developing
countries would be severely disadvantaged because there would be no way
for them to increase emissions over the next few decades.
• Differentiating emission allowances or mitigation costs based on contributions
to climate change. If responsibilities for climate change were determined
solely on the basis of past emissions, under this rule developing countries
would be expected to contribute less to corrective action than would
industrial countries.3
• Differentiating commitments based on the intensity of emissions relative to
GDP. This rule would require the greatest efforts from countries with
energy systems emitting relatively high levels of greenhouse gases. Thus it is
often seen as unfavorable not only to industrial but also developing
countries—China, India, the United States—with greenhouse gas–intensive
energy systems.
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• Differentiating commitments based on per capita GDP. This rule would allow
policymakers to take into account both the ability of industrial countries to
pay and the priority that developing countries place on such goals as
economic growth and poverty reduction. But because the rule is not
directly related to emission levels or mitigation costs, it might not provide
the right incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
• Equalizing marginal abatement costs. This rule is sometimes claimed to
establish relatively severe emissions reduction targets for countries with
inefficient energy systems. The reason is that such countries have greater
potential for low-cost emission cuts than do countries with efficient energy
systems. But this approach should be qualified by taking into account the
TABLE 1 
Proposed differentiation rules, criteria, and most favored
beneficiaries
Rule Differentiation criteria Most favored party
Equalizing per capita emission limits Per capita emissions Developing countries
Allocating emission allowances Current or cumulative Industrial countries
based on current or cumulative emissions
emissions (grandfathering)
Differentiating emission allowances Current or cumulative Developing countries
or mitigation costs based on emissions
contributions to climate change Share of responsibility
for global warming
Differentiating commitments based Emissions/GDP Countries whose energy
on the intensity of emissions relative to GDP systems
emit low levels of 
greenhouse gases 
Differentiating commitments based Per capita GDP Developing countries
on per capita GDP 
Equalizing marginal abatement costs Marginal abatement Depends on the 
costs reduction level
Differentiating abatement costs Benefits from mitigation Industrial countries
based on expected benefits from of climate change
lower greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate stabilization
structure and dynamics of each country’s energy system, because countries
with already efficient energy systems may encounter high marginal costs
while reducing emissions.
• Differentiating abatement costs based on expected benefits from lower
greenhouse gas emissions and climate stabilization. Because developing
countries will likely suffer most of the negative effects of climate instability,
the benefits of prevention might be more important for these countries.
The implication is that developing countries should be willing to pay the
highest abatement costs. In a way it would require that the “victims” pay.
But this approach must take into account the fact that developing countries
have limited financial resources for their development needs and would
probably not view investments in global climate stabilization as deserving
priority over other investments. Moreover, because this rule ignores past
emissions, it may not be very feasible politically.
All of these rules will likely generate a divergence of interests (see Shue 1992).
Even among developing countries, under certain rules some countries would be
better off than others, depending on their characteristics. Thus any international
negotiations using these rules would face multiple dividing lines cutting across
various subgroups. Moreover, the rules are partly based on different principles of
justice. Some reflect principles of equality (such as the rule calling for equal per
capita emission limits). Others are based on the principle of proportionality but
use varying reference criteria (such as emissions intensity or per capita GDP).
These different principles of justice add another source of potential disagreement,
further limiting the possibility of an easy settlement between competing expecta-
tions and claims.
The impossibility of identifying just one fair solution
Given the array of differentiation rules, coupled with the lack of consensus on any
one of them, it is easy to understand why the literature depicts the application of
principles of justice in international relations as a hotly debated, disputed, and
often unattempted solution.4 So, is there a way forward? To begin answering that
question, it is useful to explain some of the hurdles on the way.
No single criterion will be feasible. Theory tells us that some principles of justice
are “configurational” in that fair allocation is determined by characteristics of the
negotiating parties (Dupuy 1992). Albin (in this volume) uses the term “internal”
in this sense. In theory, nonconfigurational principles are more likely to lead to an
agreement. In practice, parties involved in climate change negotiations want an
agreement that takes into account their positions. The more the characteristics of
the parties differ, the less an agreement based on a nonconfigurational principle
can be expected, and the less such an agreement might derive from a single con-
figurational principle. Thus any future burden-sharing agreement involving
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developing countries will probably be based on a complex differentiation scheme
combining different basic rules.
In fact, in past negotiations countries often advocated not just one rule but a
combination (see, for example, UNFCCC 1996). Proposals for an approach using
multiple rules have also begun to emerge in the literature (see Blanchard and oth-
ers 1998; Helm and Simonis 2001; and Müller 1998, 2001). But they generally fail
to simultaneously define equitable and efficient policy options for providing cli-
mate stability.
Initial decisions will not necessarily deliver intended outcomes. Assume, for the sake
of argument, that negotiators agree to blend several differentiation rules.As noted,
the question immediately arises of how emissions trading will affect the agreed
arrangement. The flexibility mechanisms incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol are
designed to achieve emission reductions at the lowest possible costs. If these inter-
national mechanisms are used, the final distribution of actual emissions will nec-
essarily differ from the initial allocation of allowances. Thus it should be
determined how market outcomes are deviating from the agreed initial allocation
pattern. One could argue that, at least in theory, the market process will be set up
from behind a “veil of ignorance”(Rawls 1971). That is, at the outset parties would
agree on trading rules and emission allocations without being able to forecast
trading actions and thus final outcomes. But according to Dupuy (1992), the out-
comes of trade are efficient and fair because the market is free from human will,
conscience, and control.
In practice, however, parties know more or less what they can expect from
greenhouse gas emissions trading under different initial allocation schemes.5 The
“veil of ignorance” is partly removed because parties have some information
about their current and future abatement costs (through modeling exercises, for
example) as well as such costs in other countries. But the market may become a
new source of disputes—this time about the fairness of the distribution of gains
from trade, making policy consensus even harder to obtain.
In other words, final outcomes can look quite different from initial agree-
ments. Thus it may be a waste of time to debate distribution formulas and related
policy choices without analyzing how they might be affected by other conditions
along the way.
Ex post validation of pragmatic policy scenarios. Given the impossibility of agree-
ing on a single criterion and the inadvisability of reaching an initial agreement
without regard to final outcomes, how can the current negotiation dilemma be
resolved? 
Clearly, a large group of countries cannot be expected to share the same con-
cepts of distributive justice. As Fishkin (1986) points out, the ethics of interna-
tional relations are confronted with the need to find an equilibrium between
immeasurable considerations and thus with the impossibility of satisfying abso-
lutist expectations—a point that Albin (in this volume) corroborates. This real-
ization guides this chapter’s approach to the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. The main premise is that several differentiation rules must be com-
bined to achieve climate stability as efficiently as possible.
If, in addition, there is a desire to know the likely final outcomes of various
policy choices, this complex analytical challenge can be tackled only through sce-
nario building and modeling. In fact, this chapter argues that one way to advance
climate change negotiations is to support them more systematically with insights
from policy research and analysis. More concretely, it provides a scenario build-
ing and modeling exercise with two main features. First, the exercise is based on
realistic assumptions—ethical, political, economic, and technical—about global
climate stabilization. Second, the exercise provides an ex post (model run) vali-
dation of the outcome against a number of criteria that might already enjoy broad
support among different negotiating parties.6
A PRAGMATIC SCENARIO FOR STABILIZING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS BY 2030
This section explores a pragmatic “post Kyoto” (beyond 2010) scenario in which
developing countries (along with industrial countries) may be included in a com-
mitment to emission limits. The goal is not to propose a normative solution to the
climate change equity dilemma or to test the likelihood of success for any agree-
ment. Rather, it is to demonstrate the usefulness of scenario building and model-
ing as tools for decisionmaking on complex, contested issues.
The pragmatic scenario is built around a few basic assumptions. The first is
that the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions will be achieved by 2010. The sce-
nario then takes into account the total emission restrictions aimed at limiting cli-
mate change and the economic, energy, and demographic constraints of
developing countries. It is called a “soft landing” scenario because it will allow all
countries to contribute to the global goal and global public good of climate sta-
bility in a way that is politically, technically, and economically feasible. The
assumptions underlying the scenario are described in more detail below.
A first set of constraints: meeting a common target to stabilize emissions
The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
reviews a wide variety of possible trajectories for changes in emissions of the most
important greenhouse gas—carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels—
from 1990 onward, leading to the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations by
2100 or later. The scientifically defined trajectories generally aim to stabilize car-
bon dioxide concentrations at 550 parts per million by volume (ppmv). Although
“it does not imply an agreed-upon desirability of stabilization” (IPCC 2001, p.
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124), this target is often used in political discussions. Thus the scenario for allo-
cating emission allowances is based on this stabilization hypothesis.
Most of the trajectories for stabilizing concentrations at 550 ppmv by 2100
follow an inverted U-shaped curve for fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions. After
an initial growth period, emissions peak between 2020 and 2060, briefly stabilize
at that point, then decline to different levels at different rates. The maximum of
this curve most frequently ranges between 9 and 12 gigatons of carbon (IPCC
2001, pp.130, 150).
Scenario assumption 1: fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions will peak and
briefly stabilize at 10 gigatons of carbon by 2030.
Based on this assumption, the scenario develops along the lines of the Kyoto
Protocol’s primary differentiation between industrial and developing countries
for the first commitment period (2008–12). This approach is used to take into
account extremely different energy and economic dynamics.
For Annex 1 countries the scenario proposes the same emissions reduction
rates as those in the Kyoto Protocol for Canada, the United States, and the
European Union. For other countries the targets are adjusted slightly. The reduc-
tion rate for Eastern European countries matches that of the European Union (–8
percent) because these countries are expected to join the union. The target rate
for all the former Soviet republics (–5 percent) is more stringent than that under
the Kyoto Protocol (no change) because the region may benefit from better eco-
nomic conditions after 2010. In addition, the region may transfer its large surplus
of emission allowances from the first commitment period to the second. Australia
and New Zealand are supposed to stabilize emissions during 2010–30.
Scenario assumption 2: in Annex 1 countries the emissions reduction rate will
average –6.5 percent between 2010 and 2030.
For non–Annex 1 countries, based on the condition in assumption 1 that world
emissions will peak and stabilize by 2030, the scenario projects that emissions will
stabilize between 2015 and 2045.
A second set of constraints: stabilizing emissions from developing countries
For non–Annex 1 countries the proposed assumptions involve no a priori
allocation principles. Rather, they require defining:
• A departure year for determining the initial situation and dynamics of these
countries. This year is defined as 2010. By then these countries’ emissions
under a “business as usual” scenario will be about twice the level in 1990.
• Initial emissions growth rates, differentiated to account for regional
population growth between 2000 and 2010. Gradual reductions in these
rates—along with the expected absolute reductions in Annex 1 countries
(assumption 2)—lead to overall stabilization.
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• Future years by which emissions must stabilize. To define these years,
developing and industrial countries were grouped according to two criteria:
per capita GDP and per capita carbon dioxide emissions in 2000. These
criteria are used not to allocate emission allowances but to define
stabilization horizons for each of the four resulting groups (figure 1).
Group 1 in figure 1 consists of Annex 1 countries. Although the rest of the
southern European Union (RECS); the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the
Slovak Republic (CEU4); the former Soviet Union (FSUN); and the rest of Central
European countries (RCEU) fall into groups 2 and 3 in the figure, they are Annex
1 countries and regions. Thus they are included in group 1 in the analysis below
for consistency with assumption 2. The resulting picture shows why the primary
differentiation of the Kyoto Protocol (between Annex 1 and non–Annex 1 coun-
tries) may—in hindsight and with today’s data—be considered legitimate.
Meanwhile, non–Annex 1 countries fall into groups 2 (relatively high income
and emissions), 3 (intermediate income and emissions), and 4 (low income and
emissions). Why such groupings? To define a horizon of stabilization, the higher
are a country’s income and emissions, the sooner should its emissions be stabi-
FIGURE 1
Countries and regions grouped by expected year
of emissions stabilization
Note: Country and region codes are defined in the appendix. Per capita GDP is expressed in 1995 dollars, adjusted for
purchasing power parity.
Source: POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-Term Energy Systems) model database.
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lized. Conversely, a poor country with low per capita emissions should not be
required to stabilize emissions until much later.
Scenario assumption 3: countries in group 2 will stabilize emissions by 2015,
those in group 3 by 2030, and those in group 4 by 2045.
With the three preliminary assumptions in place, how can emissions allowance
profiles be designed for non–Annex 1 countries, leading from the nonbinding sit-
uation in 2010 to the country-specific stabilization horizon? The initial emissions
growth rate in 2010 is taken as the sum of an across-the-board annual growth rate
of 3 percent in per capita emissions for all developing countries7 and of the aver-
age annual population growth rate in each country between 2000 and 2010 (see
Blanchard and others 2000 for mathematical details on this growth rate). Then
this initial growth rate decreases until it reaches zero in the stabilization year
(2015, 2030, or 2045) defined for each group of developing countries. For each
group the reduction in the growth rate follows the same linear function, result-
ing in a “soft landing” of the growth rate to zero.
So, to summarize the structure of the soft-landing scenario:
• It aims to achieve a stable 10 gigatons of carbon emissions by 2030.
• It assumes that the Kyoto targets will be achieved by Annex 1 countries and
reapplied (with minor adjustments) for the second period (2010–30).
• It proposes reducing linearly the emissions growth rates for developing
countries at different horizons, taking into account their per capita GDP,
per capita carbon dioxide emissions, and population growth rates.
In addition, the model will be run without and with the assumption that inter-
national emissions trading occurs.
In defining the stabilization rate for developing countries, no particular dif-
ferentiation rule has been chosen. So, the intriguing question is, what allocation
patterns (of emission allowances or costs of emission reductions) result from the
assumptions and constraints for realistic, pragmatic considerations? And are they
fair? This is the subject of the next section.
ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF THE SOFT-LANDING SCENARIO
Figure 2 shows emissions under the scenario for 2000–50, differentiated by coun-
try group. The scenario achieves the overall target: combined emissions are sta-
bilized at 9.5 gigatons of carbon in 2030. In addition, the global stabilization target
is reached: emissions from Annex 1 countries decrease over the entire period,
while emissions from group 2 countries stabilize in 2015, those from group 3
countries in 2030, and those from group 4 countries in 2045. Of the 9.5 gigatons
of carbon in 2030, 3.7 gigatons are endowed to Annex 1 countries and 5.8 giga-
tons to developing countries.
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One requirement for the soft-landing scenario is that it be politically accept-
able to most of the negotiating parties. This goal could be achieved only if the sce-
nario were compatible with several of the differentiation rules described above.
Accordingly, this section evaluates the results of the scenario by answering several
questions. How equitable are the final outcomes? How does the scenario address
efficiency concerns? And does the scenario achieve the overall objective of com-
bining efficiency with equity?
Equity considerations
Gauging the equity of a distribution depends on the principle of justice used to
define equity (Blanchard and others 2000). One way is to consider the changes in
the distribution of per capita emissions over the period.
Figure 3 shows Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients for world carbon dioxide
emissions in 1990, 2010, and 2030.8 The 1990 curve represents real carbon dioxide
emissions, or de facto allowances for that year. The 2010 curve shows the de jure
distribution of emission allowances as called for in the Kyoto Protocol. The 2030
curve is based on the allocation of allowances under the soft-landing scenario.
When a Lorenz curve is a straight line, the distribution is considered per-
fectly egalitarian. In the allocation of allowances such a distribution would
reflect universally equal per capita emissions. Thus figure 3 shows that the situ-
ation in 1990 was the most unequal, the situation in 2010 will be less unequal,
and the hypothetical situation in 2030 even less unequal. These observations are
confirmed by the Gini coefficients, which drop from 0.52 in 1990 to 0.40 in 2010
and 0.33 in 2030.9 Thus the soft-landing scenario would reduce inequalities
FIGURE 2
Carbon dioxide emissions 
under the soft landing scenario, 2000–2050
Source: POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-Term Energy Systems) model.
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among countries by moving toward more equal per capita emission allowances.
The scenario does not, however, achieve equality. If further equality is desired,
some initial assumptions would have to be modified or further constraints
introduced.
Efficiency considerations
Governments and other stakeholders are seriously concerned about reducing
abatement costs as much as possible. What do the results of the soft-landing sce-
nario indicate about this concern? 
Abatement costs have been calculated using the POLES (Prospective Outlook
on Long-Term Energy Systems) model, a partial equilibrium model of the world
energy system.10 This model is situated between the “top down” approach of gen-
eral computable equilibrium models and the “bottom up” approach of analytical
engineering studies. In the POLES model abatement costs are estimated by intro-
ducing a shadow carbon tax—a “carbon value”—in all the energy consumption
transformation modules. This shadow tax induces adjustments in final energy
demand through technological progress or behavioral change, as well as substitu-
tions in energy conversion systems for which the technologies are explicitly iden-
tified. By first projecting a reference case in which the shadow tax is zero, it is
possible to perform iterative simulations to calculate the emissions associated
with a shadow tax that gradually increases from, say, $0 to $600 per ton of carbon.
The marginal abatement costs for a particular level of emissions are then deduced
(Criqui and Kouvaritakis 1997).11
FIGURE 3
Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients for world 
emission allowances
Cumulative emissions (percent)
Cumulative population (percent)
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Source: POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-Term Energy Systems) model.
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No trading allowed. Abatement costs under the soft-landing scenario are listed in
table 2. These costs assume that countries pursue fully autarkic policies—that is,
that they cannot trade emission allowances. Annex 1 countries are highlighted to
ease reading, and countries are ordered according to abatement costs as a per-
centage of GDP.
Under the scenario, by 2030 world emissions would be reduced by about 2,500
million tons of carbon relative to the reference situation. Annex 1 countries would
account for almost 1,400 million tons of emission reductions, or about 55 percent,
and incur 66 percent of total abatement costs. The annual sectoral cost of com-
plying with the commitments for 2030 would range between 0.01 and 1.1 percent
of GDP for Annex 1 countries and between 0 and 1 percent for non–Annex 1
countries.12 The marginal cost of the projected reductions would vary consider-
ably by region, and in extreme cases would exceed $600 per ton of carbon, with
the highest values found in Europe and Central America.
The analysis of total abatement costs recalls that costs are built up from the
combination of a price effect and a quantity effect. Thus some regions can face a
similar cost stemming from either:
• A limited amount of reductions combined with high marginal costs (the
Netherlands, rest of Western Europe).
• A greater volume of reductions achieved at low marginal costs (India).
Trading allowed. Now consider a situation where emissions trading is possible.
Numerous studies have demonstrated the economic rationale of developing a
market for emission permits (see Criqui, Mima, and Viguier 1999; Energy Journal
1999; and UNCTAD 2001). This section uses the soft-landing scenario to support
this approach.
With trading, the emissions reduction target is still about 2,500 million tons
of carbon below the reference level by 2030 (table 3). The world marginal cost of
compliance—or the permit price—comes out to $95 per ton of carbon. More than
750 million tons of carbon would be traded, representing 30 percent of the emis-
sions reduction required by the scenario, at a total value of about $71 billion. A
dozen countries and regions would export permits, the main ones being China
and the former Soviet Union. The main permit buyer would be the United States,
with 288 million tons of carbon ($27 billion). Other Annex 1 countries would buy
about 250 million tons, and permit-importing non–Annex 1 countries would buy
just over 200 million tons.
Taking the situation with no trading as a benchmark, it is possible to analyze
the potential gains from introducing international emissions trading. Table 3 con-
firms the efficiency gains from trade at the global level (a cost of 0.11 percent of
GDP instead of 0.2 percent in the no-trade case) and at the national level for all
countries. The net gains compared with the no-trading situation are significant
2
9
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TABLE 2
Abatement costs under the soft-landing scenario, with no trading
Emissions in 2030 (millions of tons of carbon) Abatement costs
Business- Marginal costs Total costs Share of 
as-usual Soft-landing Emission (1995 U.S. dollars (millions of 1995 GDP
Country or region scenario scenario reductions per ton of carbon) U.S. dollars) (percent)
Rest of Western Europe 40 20 20 >600 6,634 1.14
Rest of Central America 88 61 27 >600 7,131 1.01
Netherlands 63 38 25 >600 6,528 0.99
Korea, Republic of 249 153 96 529.3 15,643 0.84
Ireland 16 9 7 591.7 1,361 0.65
Sweden 25 14 11 471.9 2,015 0.60
Canada 170 101 69 311.0 7,759 0.54
Greece 39 22 17 230.3 1,436 0.52
Austria 18 13 6 >600 1,666 0.49
Finland 23 13 9 266.7 966 0.43
Australia and New Zealand 158 85 74 220.5 5,217 0.42
United States 1,951 1,155 796 221.6 63,634 0.41
Denmark 17 11 7 362.0 920 0.39
Rest of Southeast Asia 921 626 295 208.8 23,207 0.31
Belgium and Luxembourg 39 28 12 286.3 1,350 0.30
France 136 94 42 409.1 7,362 0.29
Spain 91 62 28 307.3 3,326 0.26
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Japan 331 259 73 322.1 10,315 0.22
United Kingdom 189 129 60 204.0 4,930 0.22
Brazil 226 181 45 212.0 4,329 0.16
Italy 116 91 25 253.4 2,440 0.13
Rest of South Asia 179 144 35 125.0 1,944 0.11
Middle East (Mediterranean) 88 74 14 115.2 694 0.09
Germany 238 194 44 118.1 2,406 0.08
Sub-Saharan Africa 587 519 68 72.1 2,105 0.08
India 1,180 989 191 65.8 5,967 0.07
Turkey 130 106 24 72.3 772 0.05
Rest of South America 210 190 20 103.5 998 0.03
Portugal 16 13 3 70.4 87 0.03
Central Europe 4a 184 168 15 32.3 237 0.02
Rest of Central Europe 98 91 6 34.3 104 0.02
Gulf states 473 445 28 25.1 338 0.02
China 2,395 2,122 274 32.2 4,230 0.02
Egypt 51 48 3 42.3 53 0.01
Morocco and Tunisia 26 24 2 32.4 26 0.01
Former Soviet Union 944 913 32 12.9 204 0.01
Mexico 183 188 –4 0.0 0 0.00
Algeria and Libyan Arab Jamahariya 52 55 –3 0.0 0 0.00
World 11,941 9,444 2,498 94.8 198,333 0.20
Note: Annex 1 countries are shaded.
a. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic. 
Source: POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-Term Energy Systems) model using ASPEN (Analyse des Systèmes de Permis d’Emissions Négociables) software.
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TABLE 3
World market for emission allowances: an equilibrium price of $95 per ton of carbon
(millions of 1995 U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified)
Emissions in 2030 Volume Cost
(millions of tons of carbon) of trade after
Business- Soft- Domestic (millions Total cost Gains trading
as-usual landing With reductions of tons Value Domestic Total without from (% of
Country or region scenario scenario trading (percent) of carbon) of trade cost cost trading trading GDP)
Korea, Republic of 249 153 207 44 –54 5,115 1,701 6,815 15,643 8,828 0.37
Greece 39 22 28 62 –6 614 416 1,031 1,436 405 0.37
Australia and New Zealand 158 85 106 71 –21 2,015 2,059 4,074 5,217 1,143 0.33
Rest of Central America 88 61 83 20 –22 2,062 265 2,328 7,131 4,803 0.33
Canada 170 101 136 49 –35 3,326 1,316 4,642 7,759 3,117 0.32
Netherlands 63 38 57 27 –19 1,764 293 2,056 6,528 4,472 0.31
United States 1,951 1,155 1,442 64 –288 27,265 20,149 47,414 63,634 16,220 0.30
Rest of Western Europe 40 20 36 21 –16 1,480 180 1,660 6,634 4,973 0.28
Finland 23 13 18 52 –5 427 210 637 966 329 0.28
Ireland 16 9 13 38 –4 423 112 535 1,361 826 0.26
Sweden 25 14 22 29 –8 738 146 884 2,015 1,131 0.26
Rest of Southeast Asia 921 626 727 66 –101 9,590 8,319 17,908 23,207 5,299 0.24
Denmark 17 11 14 45 –4 362 125 487 920 433 0.21
Belgium and Luxembourg 39 28 34 48 –6 589 246 835 1,350 514 0.18
United Kingdom 189 129 152 61 –24 2,235 1,537 3,772 4,930 1,159 0.17
Spain 91 62 77 49 –15 1,387 563 1,950 3,326 1,377 0.15
Austria 18 13 17 26 –4 412 64 476 1,666 1,190 0.14
France 136 94 123 31 –29 2,750 560 3,310 7,362 4,052 0.13
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Japan 331 259 303 39 –44 4,173 1,229 5,402 10,315 4,913 0.12
Brazil 226 181 203 52 –22 2,061 1,052 3,113 4,329 1,215 0.12
Rest of South Asia 179 144 150 81 –7 624 1,222 1,846 1,944 98 0.11
Italy 116 91 102 56 –11 1,061 590 1,651 2,440 789 0.09
Middle East (Mediterranean) 88 74 76 87 –2 174 501 675 694 19 0.09
Germany 238 194 201 85 –7 643 1,687 2,330 2,406 76 0.07
Sub-Saharan Africa 587 519 505 121 14 –1,339 3,283 1,944 2,105 161 0.07
India 1,180 989 923 135 66 –6,277 11,263 4,986 5,967 981 0.06
Turkey 130 106 101 119 5 –433 1,152 719 772 53 0.05
Portugal 16 13 13 112 0 –35 118 82 87 5 0.03
Rest of South America 210 190 191 93 –1 137 855 992 998 6 0.03
Egypt 51 48 46 167 2 –218 209 –9 53 62 0.00
Morocco and Tunisia 26 24 22 222 2 –198 153 –45 26 71 –0.01
Rest of Central Europe 98 91 83 226 8 –764 611 –154 104 257 –0.03
Central Europe 4a 184 168 146 244 22 –2,098 1,614 –485 237 721 –0.04
China 2,395 2,122 1,748 237 374 –35,436 27,164 –8,272 4,230 12,502 –0.04
Gulf states 473 445 392 289 53 –5,022 3,369 –1,653 338 1,991 –0.08
Mexico 183 188 151 — 37 –3,471 1,416 –2,055 0 2,055 –0.10
Algeria and Libyan Arab 
Jamahariya 52 55 47 — 8 –780 217 –564 0 564 –0.18
Former Soviet Union 944 913 751 613 162 –15,353 8,058 –7,296 204 7,500 –0.26
World 11,941 9,444 9,444 n.a. –754 –71,427 104,023 104,023 198,333 94,310 0.11
— Not available. 
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: Annex 1 countries are shaded.
a. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic. 
Source: POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-Term Energy Systems) model using ASPEN (Analyse des Systèmes de Permis d’Emissions Négociables) software.
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for certain regions: $67 billion for buying countries (including $16 billion for the
United States) and $27 billion for selling countries (including $12 billion for
China), for a total of $94 billion.13
The gains in cost efficiency stem from the savings that result from the equal-
ization of marginal abatement costs across countries and regions. Thus a world
market for emissions trading produces a more efficient outcome than the no-trad-
ing approach.
Of course, the values in tables 2 and 3 are indicative. The relative levels are
more significant than the absolute figures. Furthermore, the results are largely the-
oretical. Like most assessments of this kind, they rely on the assumption that all
the potential reductions can be achieved and that the flexibility mechanisms will
operate perfectly. In other words, they are based on a pure, perfect, competitive
market without transaction costs. In this context the value of the tradable permit
should be interpreted as a minimum or floor value, while the volume traded is a
maximum volume.
That said, how does the distribution of the abatement costs interfere with the
trend toward enhanced equity seen earlier?
Combining efficiency and equity
As noted, the soft-landing scenario leads toward a convergence of per capita emis-
sions over time. When trade is allowed, it is also consistent with utilitarian justice,
as it lowers the costs of providing climate stability and so increases global welfare.
Furthermore, as a group the least advantaged countries bear a smaller burden
in terms of total costs per unit of GDP. This outcome resembles Rawls’s notion of
justice, and especially the “difference principle” (or “maximin”), which gives pri-
ority to maximizing the expectations of the least favored members of society.
Again, the soft-landing scenario does not strictly apply any one notion of justice,
but from the perspective of the most commonly held notions of justice, it is mov-
ing in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has addressed the efficient and equitable provision of global public
goods using climate stabilization as an example. But the scenario suggested here
is just one possibility—other scenarios and models could be developed.14 The
accuracy of the assumptions made and constraints adopted is not the key point.
Of greater relevance is that the proposed approach would allow policymakers to
explore the effects of various policy choices in an incremental way and, most
important, to more clearly see the final outcomes. Those outcomes could then be
assessed in terms of various equity and efficiency considerations and objectives.
If the first set of likely outcomes is not satisfactory, initial assumptions could be
modified to move toward more desirable but still realistic objectives and policy
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paths. This iterative, incremental approach to policy change could ultimately gen-
erate a satisfactory outcome for negotiating parties with very different notions of
justice, fairness, and equity.
APPENDIX. COUNTRY AND REGION GROUPS FOR EXPECTED
EMISSIONS STABILIZATION
Group 1: In compliance with objectives defined in the Kyoto Protocol 
USA: United States 
CAN: Canada
PACO: rest of Pacific OECD countries
GER: Germany
RECN: rest of northern European Union 
RECS: rest of southern European Union
JPN: Japan
UK: United Kingdom
ITA: Italy
FRA: France
ROWE: rest of Western Europe
CEU4: four Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovak Republic) 
FSUN: former Soviet Union
RCEU: rest of Central European countries
Group 2: Emissions stabilize in 2015 (non–Annex 1 countries)
KOR: Korea, Republic of
Group 3: Emissions stabilize in 2030 (non–Annex 1 countries)
MIEA: Middle East
MEX: Mexico
TUR: Turkey
CHN: China
RCAM: rest of Central America
BRA: Brazil
RSAM: rest of South America
NOAF: North Africa
RSEA: rest of Southeast Asia 
Group 4: Emissions stabilize in 2045 (non–Annex 1 countries)
SSAF: Sub-Saharan Africa 
RSAS: rest of South Asia
NDE: India
NOTES
1. The text does not refer to Annex 1 and non–Annex 1 countries in this section
because some countries—such as the Republic of Korea and Singapore—that are not
in the Annex 1 group could easily be part of the industrial country group based on
GDP per capita and per capita emissions of greenhouse gases. 
2. The Global Commons Institute refers to this proposal as “contraction and con-
vergence” (GCI 1996). Agarwal and Narain (1991), along with the institute, were the
first to propose it. Their approach is developed in Agarwal (1998) and Agarwal and
Narain (1998).
3. Claussen and McNeilly (1998) consider the possibility of taking into account
future emissions (rather than past emissions) when determining each country’s
responsibility. But even if problems in deciding how to measure future emissions are
discounted, the result in terms of differentiation would be opposite to that based on
past emissions and unacceptable to developing countries.
4. On this issue, see Hassner (1996, pp. 1278–85) and Hoffmann’s comments on
Rawls (in Rawls 1996). On the specific use of justice principles and greenhouse gas
emissions, see Godard (1992), Grubb (1995), Harris (2001), Rose (1992), and
Paterson (1996). 
5. For example, Russia knows that it would be the main exporter of emission per-
mits if trading were limited to Annex 1 parties, based on Kyoto targets. In the same
way, Russia knows that China would be its main competitor in a world trading mar-
ket.
6. As some analysts (such as Müller 2001) point out, making explicit ex ante ref-
erence to certain equity principles may help prevent disagreements in future negoti-
ation steps. This is an important practical and political insight. The model in this
chapter responds to this requirement by including consensus-based principles and
rules in the scenario. In addition, negotiating parties can decide on the precise crite-
ria that they want to see used in the ex post validation of the results. 
7. Note that a per capita emissions growth rate of 3 percent corresponds to 3 per-
cent growth in per capita GDP at a constant intensity of emissions per unit of GDP.
In fact, since E/POP = (E/GDP)*(GDP/POP), a first approximation indicates addi-
tivity of the growth rates of E/GDP and GDP/POP, with negligible differences.
8. The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient were created to measure inequality
in a population’s income distribution. But they can also be used to measure equity in
the distribution of other assets, such as emission allowances.
9. A Gini coefficient of 0 indicates a perfectly equal distribution; a coefficient of
1 indicates a fully unequal distribution.
10. For more information on the POLES model, see European Commission
(1996).
11. The costs calculated in the POLES model are sectoral costs, or “gross” costs
that relate only to the adjustments needed in the energy sector. They differ from
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macroeconomic costs, which register the costs supported by a country’s entire eco-
nomic system. They also do not include the costs countries incur to monitor and
report their emissions, although these actions would be preliminary obligations for
countries accepting binding commitments.
12. According to this scenario, two non–Annex 1 regions would have emission
targets slightly less stringent than their reference emissions. Although the amount of
such “hot air” is fairly small, it implies that the scenario should be better adjusted for
these regions.
13. Some countries and regions even achieve a net gain relative to the no carbon
constraint or reference case.
14. UNCTAD (2001), for example, reviews various flexible ways for developing
countries to participate in an international emissions trading system.
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